David Hunt (Duke University), Kristen Angell (Duke University), Zhenzhou Qi (Duke University), Tingjun Chen (Duke University), Miroslav Pajic (Duke University)

Frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) millimeter-wave (mmWave) radars play a critical role in many of the advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) featured on today's vehicles. While previous works have demonstrated (only) successful false-positive spoofing attacks against these sensors, all but one assumed that an attacker had the runtime knowledge of the victim radar's configuration. In this work, we introduce MadRadar, a general black-box radar attack framework for automotive mmWave FMCW radars capable of estimating the victim radar's configuration in real-time, and then executing an attack based on the estimates. We evaluate the impact of such attacks maliciously manipulating a victim radar's point cloud, and show the novel ability to effectively `add' (i.e., false positive attacks), `remove' (i.e., false negative attacks), or `move' (i.e., translation attacks) object detections from a victim vehicle's scene. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of our attacks on real-world case studies performed using a real-time physical prototype on a software-defined radio platform.

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SigmaDiff: Semantics-Aware Deep Graph Matching for Pseudocode Diffing

Lian Gao (University of California Riverside), Yu Qu (University of California Riverside), Sheng Yu (University of California, Riverside & Deepbits Technology Inc.), Yue Duan (Singapore Management University), Heng Yin (University of California, Riverside & Deepbits Technology Inc.)

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On the Feasibility of CubeSats Application Sandboxing for Space...

Gabriele Marra (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Ulysse Planta (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security and Saarbrücken Graduate School of Computer Science), Philipp Wüstenberg (Chair of Space Technology, Technische Universität Berlin), Ali Abbasi (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security)

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Security Attacks to the Name Management Protocol in Vehicular...

Sharika Kumar (The Ohio State University), Imtiaz Karim, Elisa Bertino (Purdue University), Anish Arora (Ohio State University)

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