Hanyue Dou (Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; the School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences), Peifang Ni (Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Zhongguancun Laboratory), Yingzi Gao (Shandong University), Jing Xu (Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Zhongguancun Laboratory)

Single Secret Leader Election (SSLE) protocol facilitates the election of a single leader per round among a group of registered nodes while ensuring unpredictability. Ethereum has identified SSLE as an essential component in its development roadmap and has adopted it as a potential solution to counteract potential attacks. However, we identify a new form of attack termed the textit{state uniqueness} attack that is caused by malicious leaders proposing multiple publicly verifiable states. This attack undermines the property of textit{uniqueness} in subsequent leader elections and, with high probability, leads to violations of fundamental security properties of the over-layer protocol such as liveness. The vulnerability stems inherently from the designs reducing the uniqueness guarantee to a unique state per election, and can be generalized to the existing SSLE constructions. We further quantify the severity of this attack based on theoretical analysis and real-world executions on Ethereum, highlighting the critical challenges in designing provably secure SSLE protocols.

To address the textit{state uniqueness} attack while ensuring both security and practical performance, we present a universal SSLE protocol called Mobius that does not rely on extra trust assumptions. Specifically, Mobius prevents the generation of multiple verifiable states for each election and achieves a unique state across consecutive executions through an innovative textit{approximately-unique randomization} mechanism. In addition to providing a comprehensive security analysis in the Universal Composability framework, we develop a proof-of-concept implementation of Mobius, and conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the security and overhead. The experimental results show that Mobius exhibits enhanced security while significantly reducing communication complexity throughout the protocol execution, achieving over 80% reduction in the registration phase.

View More Papers

Tutorial: Introducing the Carbanak Attack Engagement, Version 2

Akul Goyal (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Saurav Chittal (Purdue University), Dylen Greenenwald, and Adam Bates (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Read More

VDORAM: Towards a Random Access Machine with Both Public...

Huayi Qi (Shandong University), Minghui Xu (Shandong University), Xiaohua Jia (City University of Hong Kong), Xiuzhen Cheng (Shandong University)

Read More

When Security Meets Usability: An Empirical Investigation of Post-Quantum...

Marthin Toruan (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology), R.D.N. Shakya (University of Moratuwa), Samuel Tseitkin (ExeQuantum), Raymond K. Zhao (ExeQuantum), Nalin Arachchilage (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology)

Read More