Rahmadi Trimananda (University of California, Irvine), Janus Varmarken (University of California, Irvine), Athina Markopoulou (University of California, Irvine), Brian Demsky (University of California, Irvine)

Smart home devices are vulnerable to passive inference attacks based on network traffic, even in the presence of encryption. In this paper, we present PINGPONG, a tool that can automatically extract packet-level signatures for device events (e.g., light bulb turning ON/OFF) from network traffic. We evaluated PINGPONG on popular smart home devices ranging from smart plugs and thermostats to cameras, voice-activated devices, and smart TVs. We were able to: (1) automatically extract previously unknown signatures that consist of simple sequences of packet lengths and directions; (2) use those signatures to detect the devices or specific events with an average recall of more than 97%; (3) show that the signatures are unique among hundreds of millions of packets of real world network traffic; (4) show that our methodology is also applicable to publicly available datasets; and (5) demonstrate its robustness in different settings: events triggered by local and remote smartphones, as well as by home automation systems.

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Withdrawing the BGP Re-Routing Curtain: Understanding the Security Impact...

Jared M. Smith (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Kyle Birkeland (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Tyler McDaniel (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Max Schuchard (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)

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Automated Cross-Platform Reverse Engineering of CAN Bus Commands From...

Haohuang Wen (The Ohio State University), Qingchuan Zhao (The Ohio State University), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine), Zhiqiang Lin (The Ohio State University)

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Genotype Extraction and False Relative Attacks: Security Risks to...

Peter Ney (University of Washington), Luis Ceze (University of Washington), Tadayoshi Kohno (University of Washington)

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