Zizhi Jin (Zhejiang University), Qinhong Jiang (Zhejiang University), Xuancun Lu (Zhejiang University), Chen Yan (Zhejiang University), Xiaoyu Ji (Zhejiang University), Wenyuan Xu (Zhejiang University)

LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a pivotal sensor for autonomous driving, offering precise 3D spatial information.
Previous signal attacks against LiDAR systems mainly exploit laser signals. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of cross-modality signal injection attacks, i.e., injecting intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) to manipulate LiDAR output. Our insight is that the internal modules of a LiDAR, i.e., the laser receiving circuit, the monitoring sensors, and the beam-steering modules, even with strict electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing, can still couple with the IEMI attack signals and result in the malfunction of LiDAR systems. Based on the above attack surfaces, we propose the alias attack, which manipulates LiDAR output in terms of textit{Points Interference}, textit{Points Injection}, textit{Points Removal}, and even textit{LiDAR Power-Off}.
We evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of alias with both simulated and real-world experiments on five COTS LiDAR systems.
We also conduct feasibility experiments in real-world moving scenarios.
We provide potential defense measures that can be implemented at both the sensor level and the vehicle system level to mitigate the risks associated with IEMI attacks. Video demonstrations can be viewed at textcolor{blue}{href{https://sites.google.com/view/phantomlidar}{https://sites.google.com/view/phantomlidar}}.

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