Guangke Chen (ShanghaiTech University), Yedi Zhang (National University of Singapore), Fu Song (Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

Membership inference attacks allow adversaries to determine whether a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. While previous works have confirmed the feasibility of such attacks in various applications, none has focused on speaker recognition (SR), a promising voice-based biometric recognition technique. In this work, we propose SLMIA-SR, the first membership inference attack tailored to SR. In contrast to conventional example-level attack, our attack features speaker-level membership inference, i.e., determining if any voices of a given speaker, either the same as or different from the given inference voices, have been involved in the training of a model. It is particularly useful and practical since the training and inference voices are usually distinct, and it is also meaningful considering the open-set nature of SR, namely, the recognition speakers were often not present in the training data. We utilize intra-similarity and inter-dissimilarity, two training objectives of SR, to characterize the differences between training and non-training speakers and quantify them with two groups of features driven by carefully-established feature engineering to mount the attack. To improve the generalizability of our attack, we propose a novel mixing ratio training strategy to train attack models. To enhance the attack performance, we introduce voice chunk splitting to cope with the limited number of inference voices and propose to train attack models dependent on the number of inference voices. Our attack is versatile and can work in both white-box and black-box scenarios. Additionally, we propose two novel techniques to reduce the number of black-box queries while maintaining the attack performance. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of SLMIA-SR.

View More Papers

SURGEON: Performant, Flexible and Accurate Re-Hosting via Transplantation

Florian Hofhammer (EPFL), Marcel Busch (EPFL), Qinying Wang (EPFL and Zhejiang University), Manuel Egele (Boston University), Mathias Payer (EPFL)

Read More

Enhance Stealthiness and Transferability of Adversarial Attacks with Class...

Hui Xia (Ocean University of China), Rui Zhang (Ocean University of China), Zi Kang (Ocean University of China), Shuliang Jiang (Ocean University of China), Shuo Xu (Ocean University of China)

Read More

Predictive Context-sensitive Fuzzing

Pietro Borrello (Sapienza University of Rome), Andrea Fioraldi (EURECOM), Daniele Cono D'Elia (Sapienza University of Rome), Davide Balzarotti (Eurecom), Leonardo Querzoni (Sapienza University of Rome), Cristiano Giuffrida (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Read More

Eavesdropping on Controller Acoustic Emanation for Keystroke Inference Attack...

Shiqing Luo (George Mason University), Anh Nguyen (George Mason University), Hafsa Farooq (Georgia State University), Kun Sun (George Mason University), Zhisheng Yan (George Mason University)

Read More