Weili Wang (Southern University of Science and Technology), Honghan Ji (ByteDance Inc.), Peixuan He (ByteDance Inc.), Yao Zhang (ByteDance Inc.), Ye Wu (ByteDance Inc.), Yinqian Zhang (Southern University of Science and Technology)

The advancement of trusted execution environments (TEEs) has enabled the confidential computing paradigm and created new application scenarios for WebAssembly (Wasm). "Wasm+TEE" designs achieve in-enclave multi-tenancy with strong isolation, facilitating concurrent execution of untrusted code instances from multiple users. However, the linear memory model of Wasm lacks efficient cross-module data sharing and fine-grained memory access control, significantly restricting its applications in certain confidential computing scenarios where secure data sharing is essential (e.g., confidential stateful FaaS and data marketplaces). In this paper, we propose WAVEN (WebAssembly Memory Virtualization for ENclaves), a novel WebAssembly memory virtualization scheme, to enable memory sharing among Wasm modules and page-level access control. We implement WAVEN atop WAMR, a popular Wasm runtime for TEEs, and empirically demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first approach that enables cross-module memory sharing with fine-grained memory access control in Wasm.

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Ctrl+Alt+Deceive: Quantifying User Exposure to Online Scams

Platon Kotzias (Norton Research Group, BforeAI), Michalis Pachilakis (Norton Research Group, Computer Science Department University of Crete), Javier Aldana Iuit (Norton Research Group), Juan Caballero (IMDEA Software Institute), Iskander Sanchez-Rola (Norton Research Group), Leyla Bilge (Norton Research Group)

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Manifoldchain: Maximizing Blockchain Throughput via Bandwidth-Clustered Sharding

Chunjiang Che (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)), Songze Li (Southeast University), Xuechao Wang (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou))

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FUZZUER: Enabling Fuzzing of UEFI Interfaces on EDK-2

Connor Glosner (Purdue University), Aravind Machiry (Purdue University)

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Wallbleed: A Memory Disclosure Vulnerability in the Great Firewall...

Shencha Fan (GFW Report), Jackson Sippe (University of Colorado Boulder), Sakamoto San (Shinonome Lab), Jade Sheffey (UMass Amherst), David Fifield (None), Amir Houmansadr (UMass Amherst), Elson Wedwards (None), Eric Wustrow (University of Colorado Boulder)

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