Varun Gadey (University of Würzburg), Melanie Melanie Gotz (University of Würzburg), Christoph Sendner (University of Würzburg), Sampo Sovio (Huawei Technologies), Alexandra Dmitrienko (University of Wuerzburg)
Modern systems increasingly rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone, to securely isolate sensitive code and reduce the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). However, identifying the precise regions of code especially those involving cryptographic logic that should reside within a TEE remains challenging, as it requires deep manual inspection and is not supported by automated tools yet. To solve this open problem, we propose LLM based Code Annotation Logic (LLM-CAL), a tool that automates the identification of security-sensitive code regions with a focus on cryptographic implementations by leveraging most recent and advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Our approach leverages foundational LLMs (Gemma-2B, CodeGemma-2B, and LLaMA7B), which we fine-tuned using a newly collected and manually labeled dataset of over 4,000 C source files. We encode local context features, global semantic information, and structural metadata into compact input sequences that guide the model in capturing subtle patterns of security sensitivity in code. The fine-tuning process is based on quantized LoRA—a parameter-efficient technique that introduces lightweight, trainable adapters into the LLM architecture. To support practical deployment, we developed a scalable pipeline for data preprocessing and inference. LLM-CAL achieves an F1 score of 98.40% and a recall of 97.50% in identifying sensitive and non-sensitive code. It represents the first effort to automate the annotation of cryptographic security-sensitive code for TEE-enabled platforms, aiming to minimize the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and optimize TEE usage to enhance overall system security.