Jonathan Evertz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Niklas Risse (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Nicolai Neuer (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Andreas Müller (Ruhr University Bochum), Philipp Normann (TU Wien), Gaetano Sapia (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Srishti Gupta (Sapienza University of Rome), David Pape (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Soumya Shaw (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Devansh Srivastav (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Christian Wressnegger (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Erwin Quiring (_fbeta), Thorsten Eisenhofer (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Daniel Arp (TU Wien), Lea Schönherr (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security)

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly prevalent in security research. Their unique characteristics, however, introduce challenges that undermine established paradigms of reproducibility, rigor, and evaluation. Prior work has identified common pitfalls in traditional machine learning research, but these studies predate the advent of LLMs. In this paper, we identify nine common pitfalls that have become (more) relevant with the emergence of LLMs and that can compromise the validity of research involving them. These pitfalls span the entire computation process, from data collection, pre-training, and fine-tuning to prompting and evaluation.

We assess the prevalence of these pitfalls across all 72 peer-reviewed papers published at leading Security and Software Engineering venues between 2023 and 2024. We find that every paper contains at least one pitfall, and each pitfall appears in multiple papers. Yet only 15.7% of the present pitfalls were explicitly discussed, suggesting that the majority remain unrecognized. To understand their practical impact, we conduct four empirical case studies showing how individual pitfalls can mislead evaluation, inflate performance, or impair reproducibility. Based on our findings, we offer actionable guidelines to support the community in future work.

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On the Security Risks of Memory Adaptation and Augmentation...

Hocheol Nam (KAIST), Daehyun Lim (KAIST), Huancheng Zhou (Texas A&M University), Guofei Gu (Texas A&M University), Min Suk Kang (KAIST)

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15 Years of Binary Analysis – What worked, and...

Marion Marschalek, Hack & Cheese Security Consulting

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HoneySat: A Network-based Satellite Honeypot Framework

Efrén López-Morales (New Mexico State University), Ulysse Planta (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Gabriele Marra (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Carlos Gonzalez-Cortes (Universidad de Santiago de Chile and German Aerospace Center (DLR)), Jacob Hopkins (Texas A&M University - Corpus Christi), Majid Garoosi (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Elías Obreque (Universidad de Chile),…

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