Bingsheng Zhang (Lancaster University), Roman Oliynykov (IOHK Ltd.), Hamed Balogun (Lancaster University)

A treasury system is a community-controlled and decentralized collaborative decision-making mechanism for sustainable funding of blockchain development and maintenance. During each treasury period, project proposals are submitted, discussed, and voted for; top-ranked projects are funded from the treasury. The Dash governance system is a real-world example of such kind of systems. In this work, we, for the first time, provide a rigorous study of the treasury system. We modelled, designed, and implemented a provably secure treasury system that is compatible with most existing blockchain infrastructures, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. More specifically, the proposed treasury system supports liquid democracy/delegative voting for better collaborative intelligence. Namely, the stake holders can either vote directly on the proposed projects or delegate their votes to experts. Its core component is a distributed universally composable secure end-to-end verifiable voting protocol. The integrity of the treasury voting decisions is guaranteed even when all the voting committee members are corrupted. To further improve efficiency, we proposed the world’s first honest verifier zero-knowledge proof for unit vector encryption with logarithmic size communication. This partial result may be of independent interest to other cryptographic protocols. A pilot system is implemented in Scala over the Scorex 2.0 framework, and its benchmark results indicate that the proposed system can support tens of thousands of treasury participants with high efficiency.

View More Papers

Vault: Fast Bootstrapping for the Algorand Cryptocurrency

Derek Leung (MIT CSAIL), Adam Suhl (MIT CSAIL), Yossi Gilad (MIT CSAIL), Nickolai Zeldovich (MIT CSAIL)

Read More

PeriScope: An Effective Probing and Fuzzing Framework for the...

Dokyung Song (University of California, Irvine), Felicitas Hetzelt (Technical University of Berlin), Dipanjan Das (University of California, Santa Barbara), Chad Spensky (University of California, Santa Barbara), Yeoul Na (University of California, Irvine), Stijn Volckaert (University of California, Irvine and KU Leuven), Giovanni Vigna (University of California, Santa Barbara), Christopher Kruegel (University of California, Santa Barbara),…

Read More

BadBluetooth: Breaking Android Security Mechanisms via Malicious Bluetooth Peripherals

Fenghao Xu (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), Wenrui Diao (Jinan University), Zhou Li (University of California, Irvine), Jiongyi Chen (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), Kehuan Zhang (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Read More

Automating Patching of Vulnerable Open-Source Software Versions in Application...

Ruian Duan (Georgia Institute of Technology), Ashish Bijlani (Georgia Institute of Technology), Yang Ji (Georgia Institute of Technology), Omar Alrawi (Georgia Institute of Technology), Yiyuan Xiong (Peking University), Moses Ike (Georgia Institute of Technology), Brendan Saltaformaggio (Georgia Institute of Technology), Wenke Lee (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Read More