Liang Wang, Hyojoon Kim, Prateek Mittal, Jennifer Rexford (Princeton University)

In conventional DNS, or Do53, requests and responses are sent in cleartext. Thus, DNS recursive resolvers or any on-path adversaries can access privacy-sensitive information. To address this issue, several encryption-based approaches (e.g., DNS-over-HTTPS) and proxy-based approaches (e.g., Oblivious DNS) were proposed. However, encryption-based approaches put too much trust in recursive resolvers. Proxy-based approaches can help hide the client’s identity, but sets a higher deployment barrier while also introducing noticeable performance overhead. We propose PINOT, a packet-header obfuscation system that runs entirely in the data plane of a programmable network switch, which provides a lightweight, low-deployment-barrier anonymization service for clients sending and receiving DNS packets. PINOT does not require any modification to the DNS protocol or additional client software installation or proxy setup. Yet, it can also be combined with existing approaches to provide stronger privacy guarantees. We implement a PINOT prototype on a commodity switch, deploy it in a campus network, and present results on protecting user identity against public DNS services.

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POSEIDON: Privacy-Preserving Federated Neural Network Learning

Sinem Sav (EPFL), Apostolos Pyrgelis (EPFL), Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza (EPFL), David Froelicher (EPFL), Jean-Philippe Bossuat (EPFL), Joao Sa Sousa (EPFL), Jean-Pierre Hubaux (EPFL)

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FLTrust: Byzantine-robust Federated Learning via Trust Bootstrapping

Xiaoyu Cao (Duke University), Minghong Fang (The Ohio State University), Jia Liu (The Ohio State University), Neil Zhenqiang Gong (Duke University)

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Towards Understanding and Detecting Cyberbullying in Real-world Images

Nishant Vishwamitra (University at Buffalo), Hongxin Hu (University at Buffalo), Feng Luo (Clemson University), Long Cheng (Clemson University)

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Rosita: Towards Automatic Elimination of Power-Analysis Leakage in Ciphers

Madura A. Shelton (University of Adelaide), Niels Samwel (Radboud University), Lejla Batina (Radboud University), Francesco Regazzoni (University of Amsterdam and ALaRI – USI), Markus Wagner (University of Adelaide), Yuval Yarom (University of Adelaide and Data61)

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