Evan Allen (Virginia Tech), Zeb Bowden (Virginia Tech Transportation Institute), J. Scot Ransbottom (Virginia Tech)

Attackers have found numerous vulnerabilities in the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) of modern vehicles, enabling them to stop the car, control its brakes, and take other potentially disruptive actions. Many of these attacks were possible because the vehicles had insecure In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs), where ECUs could send any message to each other. For example, an attacker who compromised an infotainment ECU might be able to send a braking message to a wheel. In this work, we introduce a scheme based on distributed firewalls to block these unauthorized messages according to a set “security policy” defining what transmissions each ECU should be able to send and receive. We leverage the topology of new switched, zonal networks to authenticate messages without cryptography, using Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAMs) to enforce the policy at wire-speed. Crucially, our approach minimizes the security burden on edge ECUs and places control in a set of hardened zonal gateways. Through an OMNeT++ simulation of a zonal IVN, we demonstrate that our scheme has much lower overhead than modern cryptography-based approaches and allows for realtime, low-latency (​<0.1 ms) traffic.

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CAGE: Complementing Arm CCA with GPU Extensions

Chenxu Wang (Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech) and The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Fengwei Zhang (Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech)), Yunjie Deng (Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech)), Kevin Leach (Vanderbilt University), Jiannong Cao (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Zhenyu Ning (Hunan University), Shoumeng Yan (Ant Group), Zhengyu He (Ant…

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DEMASQ: Unmasking the ChatGPT Wordsmith

Kavita Kumari (Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany), Alessandro Pegoraro (Technical University of Darmstadt), Hossein Fereidooni (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (Technical University of Darmstadt)

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File Hijacking Vulnerability: The Elephant in the Room

Chendong Yu (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences), Yang Xiao (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences), Jie Lu (Institute of Computing Technology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences), Yuekang…

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HEIR: A Unified Representation for Cross-Scheme Compilation of Fully...

Song Bian (Beihang University), Zian Zhao (Beihang University), Zhou Zhang (Beihang University), Ran Mao (Beihang University), Kohei Suenaga (Kyoto University), Yier Jin (University of Science and Technology of China), Zhenyu Guan (Beihang University), Jianwei Liu (Beihang University)

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