Ronghua Li (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Shinan Liu (The University of Hong Kong), Haibo Hu (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, PolyU Research Centre for Privacy and Security Technologies in Future Smart Systems), Qingqing Ye (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Nick Feamster (University of Chicago)

IoT environments such as smart homes are susceptible to privacy inference attacks, where attackers can analyze patterns of encrypted network traffic to infer the state of devices and even the activities of people. While most existing attacks exploit ML techniques for discovering such traffic patterns, they underperform on wireless traffic, especially Wi-Fi, due to its heavy noisiness and the packet loss of wireless sniffing. In addition, these approaches commonly target distinguishing chunked IoT event traffic samples, and they fail at effectively tracking multiple events simultaneously. In this work, we propose WiFinger, a fine-grained multi-IoT event fingerprinting approach against noisy traffic. WiFinger turns the traffic pattern classification task into a subsequence matching problem and introduces novel techniques to account for the high time complexity while maintaining high accuracy. In addition, its reliance on training sample volumes reduces efforts for any future fingerprint updates. Experiments demonstrate that WiFinger outperforms existing approaches under practical threat models, with an average recall of 89% (v.s. 49% and 46% respectively) and almost zero false positives for various IoT events.

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HoneySat: A Network-based Satellite Honeypot Framework

Efrén López-Morales (New Mexico State University), Ulysse Planta (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Gabriele Marra (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Carlos Gonzalez-Cortes (Universidad de Santiago de Chile and German Aerospace Center (DLR)), Jacob Hopkins (Texas A&M University - Corpus Christi), Majid Garoosi (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Elías Obreque (Universidad de Chile),…

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LAPSE: Automatic, Formal Fault-Tolerant Correctness Proofs for Native Code

Charles Averill, Ilan Buzzetti (The University of Texas at Dallas), Alex Bellon (UC San Diego), Kevin Hamlen (The University of Texas at Dallas)

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NetCap: Data-Plane Capability-Based Defense Against Token Theft in Network...

Osama Bajaber (Virginia Tech), Bo Ji (Virginia Tech), Peng Gao (Virginia Tech)

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