Pascal Zimmer (Ruhr University Bochum), Simon Lachnit (Ruhr University Bochum), Alexander Jan Zielinski (Ruhr University Bochum), Ghassan Karame (Ruhr University Bochum)

A number of attacks rely on infrared light sources or heat-absorbing material to imperceptibly fool systems into misinterpreting visual input in various image recognition applications. However, almost all existing approaches can only mount untargeted attacks and require heavy optimizations due to the use-case-specific constraints, such as location and shape.

In this paper, we propose a novel, stealthy, and cost-effective attack to generate both targeted and untargeted adversarial infrared perturbations. By projecting perturbations from a transparent film onto the target object with an off-the-shelf infrared flashlight, our approach is the first to reliably mount laser-free targeted attacks in the infrared domain. Extensive experiments on traffic signs in the digital and physical domains show that our approach is robust and yields higher attack success rates in various attack scenarios across bright lighting conditions, distances, and angles compared to prior work. Equally important, our attack is highly cost-effective, requiring less than $50 and a few tens of seconds for deployment. Finally, we propose a novel segmentation-based detection that thwarts our attack with an F1-score of up to 99%

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