Yulong Cao (University of Michigan), Yanan Guo (University of Pittsburgh), Takami Sato (UC Irvine), Qi Alfred Chen (UC Irvine), Z. Morley Mao (University of Michigan) and Yueqiang Cheng (NIO)

Advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS) are widely used by modern vehicle manufacturers to automate, adapt and enhance vehicle technology for safety and better driving. In this work, we design a practical attack against automated lane centering (ALC), a crucial functionality of ADAS, with remote adversarial patches. We identify that the back of a vehicle is an effective attack vector and improve the attack robustness by considering various input frames. The demo includes videos that show our attack can divert victim vehicle out of lane on a representative ADAS, Openpilot, in a simulator.

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FirmWire: Transparent Dynamic Analysis for Cellular Baseband Firmware

Grant Hernandez (University of Florida), Marius Muench (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Dominik Maier (TU Berlin), Alyssa Milburn (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Shinjo Park (TU Berlin), Tobias Scharnowski (Ruhr-University Bochum), Tyler Tucker (University of Florida), Patrick Traynor (University of Florida), Kevin Butler (University of Florida)

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Get a Model! Model Hijacking Attack Against Machine Learning...

Ahmed Salem (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Michael Backes (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Yang Zhang (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security)

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Progressive Scrutiny: Incremental Detection of UBI bugs in the...

Yizhuo Zhai (University of California, Riverside), Yu Hao (University of California, Riverside), Zheng Zhang (University of California, Riverside), Weiteng Chen (University of California, Riverside), Guoren Li (University of California, Riverside), Zhiyun Qian (University of California, Riverside), Chengyu Song (University of California, Riverside), Manu Sridharan (University of California, Riverside), Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy (University of California, Riverside),…

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Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Benchmark

Deborah Blevins (University of Kentucky), Pablo Moriano, Robert Bridges, Miki Verma, Michael Iannacone, and Samuel Hollifield (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)

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