Katherine S. Zhang (Purdue University), Claire Chen (Pennsylvania State University), Aiping Xiong (Pennsylvania State University)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems in autonomous driving are vulnerable to a number of attacks, particularly the physical-world attacks that tamper with physical objects in the driving environment to cause AI errors. When AI systems fail or are about to fail, human drivers are required to take over vehicle control. To understand such human and AI collaboration, in this work, we examine 1) whether human drivers can detect these attacks, 2) how they project the consequent autonomous driving, 3) and what information they expect for safely taking over the vehicle control. We conducted an online survey on Prolific. Participants (N = 100) viewed benign and adversarial images of two physical-world attacks. We also presented videos of simulated driving for both attacks. Our results show that participants did not seem to be aware of the attacks. They overestimated the AI’s ability to detect the object in the dirty-road attack than in the stop-sign attack. Such overestimation was also evident when participants predicted AI’s ability in autonomous driving. We also found that participants expected different information (e.g., warnings and AI explanations) for safely taking over the control of autonomous driving.

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Evan Allen (Virginia Tech), Zeb Bowden (Virginia Tech Transportation Institute), Randy Marchany (Virginia Tech), J. Scot Ransbottom (Virginia Tech)

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Access Your Tesla without Your Awareness: Compromising Keyless Entry...

Xinyi Xie (Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Co., Ltd.), Kun Jiang (Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Co., Ltd.), Rui Dai (Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Co., Ltd.), Jun Lu (Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Co., Ltd.), Lihui Wang (Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Co., Ltd.), Qing Li (State Key Laboratory of ASIC & System, Fudan University), Jun Yu (State Key…

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Breaking and Fixing Virtual Channels: Domino Attack and Donner

Lukas Aumayr (TU Wien), Pedro Moreno-Sanchez (IMDEA Software Institute), Aniket Kate (Purdue University / Supra), Matteo Maffei (Christian Doppler Laboratory Blockchain Technologies for the Internet of Things / TU Wien)

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