Junpeng Wan, Louis Zheng-Hua Tan, Dave (Jing) Tian (Purdue University)

NVIDIA GPUs underpin the vast majority of modern AI workloads. These workloads are ultimately executed in the form of Streaming Assembly (SASS), the lowest-level assembly for NVIDIA hardware. However, SASS remains largely undocumented, let alone well studied, posing a significant barrier to downstream security applications, such as security auditing, vulnerability discovery, binary hardening, etc.

In this paper, we address this challenge with NVLift, a systematic framework that lifts NVIDIA GPU SASS into LLVM IR to enable downstream GPU binary analysis. To lift SASS instructions, NVLift reconstructs instruction semantics by consolidating prior reverse-engineering efforts and validating execution behaviors at runtime using cuda-gdb. To verify the semantic correctness of the lifted IR, we design and implement a differential testing pipeline by compiling the lifted IR into SASS and comparing the GPU execution results against the SASS generated from the reference CUDA kernel compilation. In total, NVLift supports 47 commonly used SASS instructions on the Turing architecture (SM75), covering 88.39% of instruction occurrence count in popular CUDA libraries. Using NVLift, we lifted 11 CUDA kernels, including representative DNN operators, and verified the semantic correctness of 5 kernels. We further provide a PoC implementation of GPU binary decompilation by translating the lifted LLVM IR into pseudo C code using RetDec. In sum, NVLift is a critical step towards enabling GPU binary analysis and downstream security applications.

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