Bokai Zhang, Monika Santra, Syed Rafiul Hussain, Gang Tan (Pennsylvania State University)

Sound indirect-call resolution for stripped binaries is critical for security applications such as CFI enforcement, debloating, and large-scale vulnerability discovery, yet it remains challenging in the absence of symbol and type information. A recent work, Block-Based Points-to Analysis (BPA) addresses this problem with a scalable block memory model, but its implementation is tightly coupled to 32-bit x86 through an ISA-specific disassembly pipeline.

To overcome this limitation, we present BPA-X, an architecture-agnostic block-based points-to analysis framework for stripped binaries across multiple ISAs. BPA-X preserves the core soundness assumptions of BPA’s block memory model while replacing x86-specific components with an architecture-agnostic VEX IR via binary analysis platform angr. It generalizes local and global memory-block partitioning using VEX semantics instead of x86-specific patterns, lifts VEX IR into SSA form, and performs fixpoint computation on interprocedural value tracking and reachability analysis.

Our evaluation on SPEC CPU 2006 and real-world server binaries shows that BPA-X improves memory-block partitioning, reduces AICT on many x86 programs compared to BPA, and extends the analysis to x64 without degrading much precision. BPA-X also reduces memory consumption by 25% and improves runtime on large benchmarks.

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DirtyFree: Simplified Data-Oriented Programming in the Linux Kernel

Yoochan Lee (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Hyuk Kwon (Theori, Inc.), Thorsten Holz (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy)

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Enhancing Legal Document Security and Accessibility with TAF

Renata Vaderna (Independent Researcher), Dušan Nikolić (University of Novi Sad), Patrick Zielinski (New York University), David Greisen (Open Law Library), BJ Ard (University of Wisconsin–Madison), Justin Cappos (New York University)

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ropbot: Reimaging Code Reuse Attack Synthesis

Kyle Zeng (Arizona State University), Moritz Schloegel (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Christopher Salls (UC Santa Barbara), Adam Doupé (Arizona State University), Ruoyu Wang (Arizona State University), Yan Shoshitaishvili (Arizona State University), Tiffany Bao (Arizona State University)

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