Yinggang Guo (State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University; University of Minnesota), Zicheng Wang (State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University), Weiheng Bai (University of Minnesota), Qingkai Zeng (State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University), Kangjie Lu (University of Minnesota)

The endless stream of vulnerabilities urgently calls for principled mitigation to confine the effect of exploitation. However, the monolithic architecture of commodity OS kernels, like the Linux kernel, allows an attacker to compromise the entire system by exploiting a vulnerability in any kernel component. Kernel compartmentalization is a promising approach that follows the least-privilege principle. However, existing mechanisms struggle with the trade-off on security, scalability, and performance, given the challenges stemming from mutual untrustworthiness among numerous and complex components.

In this paper, we present BULKHEAD, a secure, scalable, and efficient kernel compartmentalization technique that offers bi-directional isolation for unlimited compartments. It leverages Intel's new hardware feature PKS to isolate data and code into mutually untrusted compartments and benefits from its fast compartment switching. With untrust in mind, BULKHEAD introduces a lightweight in-kernel monitor that enforces multiple important security invariants, including data integrity, execute-only memory, and compartment interface integrity. In addition, it provides a locality-aware two-level scheme that scales to unlimited compartments. We implement a prototype system on Linux v6.1 to compartmentalize loadable kernel modules (LKMs). Extensive evaluation confirms the effectiveness of our approach. As the system-wide impacts, BULKHEAD incurs an average performance overhead of 2.44% for real-world applications with 160 compartmentalized LKMs. While focusing on a specific compartment, ApacheBench tests on ipv6 show an overhead of less than 2%. Moreover, the performance is almost unaffected by the number of compartments, which makes it highly scalable.

View More Papers

Victim-Centred Abuse Investigations and Defenses for Social Media Platforms

Zaid Hakami (Florida International University and Jazan University), Ashfaq Ali Shafin (Florida International University), Peter J. Clarke (Florida International University), Niki Pissinou (Florida International University), and Bogdan Carbunar (Florida International University)

Read More

ERW-Radar: An Adaptive Detection System against Evasive Ransomware by...

Lingbo Zhao (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Yuhui Zhang (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Zhilu Wang (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Fengkai Yuan (Institute of Information Engineering, CAS), Rui Hou (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences)

Read More

Revisiting Physical-World Adversarial Attack on Traffic Sign Recognition: A...

Ningfei Wang (University of California, Irvine), Shaoyuan Xie (University of California, Irvine), Takami Sato (University of California, Irvine), Yunpeng Luo (University of California, Irvine), Kaidi Xu (Drexel University), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine)

Read More

Evaluating LLMs Towards Automated Assessment of Privacy Policy Understandability

Keika Mori (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC, Waseda University), Daiki Ito (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Takumi Fukunaga (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Takuya Watanabe (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Yuta Takata (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Masaki Kamizono (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Tatsuya Mori (Waseda University, NICT, RIKEN AIP)

Read More