Jonathan Evertz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Niklas Risse (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Nicolai Neuer (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Andreas Müller (Ruhr University Bochum), Philipp Normann (TU Wien), Gaetano Sapia (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Srishti Gupta (Sapienza University of Rome), David Pape (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Soumya Shaw (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Devansh Srivastav (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Christian Wressnegger (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Erwin Quiring (_fbeta), Thorsten Eisenhofer (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Daniel Arp (TU Wien), Lea Schönherr (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security)

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly prevalent in security research. Their unique characteristics, however, introduce challenges that undermine established paradigms of reproducibility, rigor, and evaluation. Prior work has identified common pitfalls in traditional machine learning research, but these studies predate the advent of LLMs. In this paper, we identify nine common pitfalls that have become (more) relevant with the emergence of LLMs and that can compromise the validity of research involving them. These pitfalls span the entire computation process, from data collection, pre-training, and fine-tuning to prompting and evaluation.

We assess the prevalence of these pitfalls across all 72 peer-reviewed papers published at leading Security and Software Engineering venues between 2023 and 2024. We find that every paper contains at least one pitfall, and each pitfall appears in multiple papers. Yet only 15.7% of the present pitfalls were explicitly discussed, suggesting that the majority remain unrecognized. To understand their practical impact, we conduct four empirical case studies showing how individual pitfalls can mislead evaluation, inflate performance, or impair reproducibility. Based on our findings, we offer actionable guidelines to support the community in future work.

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ropbot: Reimaging Code Reuse Attack Synthesis

Kyle Zeng (Arizona State University), Moritz Schloegel (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Christopher Salls (UC Santa Barbara), Adam Doupé (Arizona State University), Ruoyu Wang (Arizona State University), Yan Shoshitaishvili (Arizona State University), Tiffany Bao (Arizona State University)

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Cognitive Threat Detection for SOC Operations: Automating Manipulation Tactic...

Keerthana Madhavan (School of Computer Science, University of Guelph, Canada), Luiza Antonie (School of Computer Science; CARE-AI, University of Guelph, Canada), Stacey D. Scott, School of Computer Science; CARE-AI, University of Guelph, Canada)

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Know Me by My Pulse: Toward Practical Continuous Authentication...

Wei Shao (University of California, Davis), Zequan Liang (University of California Davis), Ruoyu Zhang (University of California, Davis), Ruijie Fang (University of California, Davis), Ning Miao (University of California, Davis), Ehsan Kourkchi (University of California - Davis), Setareh Rafatirad (University of California, Davis), Houman Homayoun (University of California Davis), Chongzhou Fang (Rochester Institute of Technology)

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