Seungkyun Han (Chungnam National University), Jinsoo Jang (Chungnam National University)

We propose a solution, MyTEE, that enables a trusted execution environment (TEE) to be built even in worst-case environments wherein major hardware security primitives (e.g., ARM TrustZone extensions for memory access control) are absent. Crafting page tables for memory isolation, filtering DMA packets, and enabling secure IO exist at the core of MyTEE. Particularly for secure IO, we shield the IO buffers and memory-mapped registers of the controllers and securely escalate the privilege of the partial code block of the device drivers to provide permission to access the protected objects. By doing so, the need to host the device driver in the TEE (in whole or in part), which can potentially introduce a new attack surface, is exempted. The proof-of-concept (PoC) of MyTEE is implemented on the Raspberry Pi 3 board, which does not support most of the important security primitives for building the TEE. Additionally, three secure IO examples with the hardware TPM, framebuffer, and USB keyboard are demonstrated to show the feasibility of our approach.

View More Papers

Backdoor Attacks Against Dataset Distillation

Yugeng Liu (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Zheng Li (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Michael Backes (CISPA Helmholtz...

Read More

CANtropy: Time Series Feature Extraction-Based Intrusion Detection Systems for...

Md Hasan Shahriar, Wenjing Lou, Y. Thomas Hou (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

Read More

No Grammar, No Problem: Towards Fuzzing the Linux Kernel...

Alexander Bulekov (Boston University), Bandan Das (Red Hat), Stefan Hajnoczi (Red Hat), Manuel Egele (Boston University)

Read More

Evasion Attacks and Defenses on Smart Home Physical Event...

Muslum Ozgur Ozmen (Purdue University), Ruoyu Song (Purdue University), Habiba Farrukh (Purdue University), Z. Berkay Celik (Purdue University)

Read More