Omar Abusabha (Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea), Jiyong Uhm (Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea), Tamer Abuhmed (Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea), Hyungjoon Koo (Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea)

A function inlining optimization is a widely used transformation in modern compilers, which replaces a call site with the callee’s body in need. While this transformation improves performance, it significantly impacts static features such as machine instructions and control flow graphs, which are crucial to binary analysis. Yet, despite its broad impact, the security impact of function inlining remains underexplored to date. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive study of function inlining through the lens of machine learning-based binary analysis. To this end, we dissect the inlining decision pipeline within the LLVM’s cost model and explore the combinations of the compiler options that aggressively promote the function inlining ratio beyond standard optimization levels, which we term extreme inlining. We focus on five ML-assisted binary analysis tasks for security, using 20 unique models to systematically evaluate their robustness under extreme inlining scenarios. Our extensive experiments reveal several significant findings: i) function inlining, though a benign transformation in intent, can (in)directly affect ML model behaviors, being potentially exploited by evading discriminative or generative ML models; ii) ML models relying on static features can be highly sensitive to inlining; iii) subtle compiler settings can be leveraged to deliberately craft evasive binary variants; and iv) inlining ratios vary substantially across applications and build configurations, undermining assumptions of consistency in training and evaluation of ML models.

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Eden Luzon (Ben-Gurion University, Institute of Software Systems and Security), Guy Amit (Ben-Gurion University, Institute of Software Systems and Security), Roy Weiss (Ben-Gurion University, Institute of Software Systems and Security), Torsten Krauß (University of Würzburg), Alexandra Dmitrienko (University of Würzburg), Yisroel Mirsky (Ben-Gurion University, Institute of Software Systems and Security)

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Meng Wang (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Philipp Görz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Joschua Schilling (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Keno Hassler (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Liwei Guo (University of Electronic Science and Technology), Thorsten Holz (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Ali Abbasi (CISPA Helmholtz Center for…

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BACnet or “BADnet”? On the (In)Security of Implicitly Reserved...

Qiguang Zhang (Southeast University), Junzhou Luo (Southeast University, Fuyao University of Science and Technology), Zhen Ling (Southeast University), Yue Zhang (Shandong University), Chongqing Lei (Southeast University), Christopher Morales (University of Massachusetts Lowell), Xinwen Fu (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

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