Jiahui Wang (Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China), Xiangmin Shen (Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY, USA), Zhengkai Wang (Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China), Zhenyuan Li (Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China)

Provenance-based backward tracking is a critical technique for investigating Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). However, existing approaches utilizing reachability analysis or statistical anomaly detection often suffer from dependency explosion and a significant semantic gap. These methods cannot typically distinguish high-level adversarial intent from benign administrative activities, resulting in a substantial number of false positives.

In this paper, we introduce TRACKAGENT, a novel system that conceptualizes backward tracking as a knowledge-augmented, context-aware reasoning task. By leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) enhanced with a knowledge augmentation module, TRACKAGENT aims to bridge the gap between low-level log events and attack intent. Furthermore, we design a context management model to handle the long-term dependencies of APT campaigns within finite context windows.

We report preliminary evaluations on DARPA TC, Aurora, and OpTC datasets to assess the feasibility of this approach. Early results suggest that compared to state-of-the-art baselines, TRACKAGENT can achieve higher fidelity (precision and recall) while generating significantly smaller attack subgraphs. These findings provide early evidence of the LLM-enhanced system’s potential to detect critical attack behaviors from massive background noise, while offering analysts concise and interpretable forensic explanations.

View More Papers

Validity Is Not Enough: Uncovering the Security Pitfall in...

Di Zhai (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jiashuo Zhang (Peking University), Jianbo Gao (Beijing Jiaotong University), Tianhao Liu (Beijing Jiaotong University), Tao Zhang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jian Wang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jiqiang Liu (Beijing Jiaotong University)

Read More

Breaking Isolation: A New Perspective on Hypervisor Exploitation via...

Gaoning Pan (Hangzhou Dianzi University & Zhejiang Provincial Key Laboratory of Sensitive Data Security and Confidentiality Governance), Yiming Tao (Zhejiang University), Qinying Wang (EPFL and Zhejiang University), Chunming Wu (Zhejiang University), Mingde Hu (Hangzhou Dianzi University & Zhejiang Provincial Key Laboratory of Sensitive Data Security and Confidentiality Governance), Yizhi Ren (Hangzhou Dianzi University & Zhejiang…

Read More

Why is Space Cybersecurity Unique?

Rajiv Thummala (Sibley School of MAE, Cornell University), Eric Race (Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology), Gregory Falco (Sibley School of MAE, Cornell University)

Read More