Rama Rohit Reddy Gangula (Indeed), Vijay Vardhan Alluri (Indeed), Saif Jawaid (Indeed), Dhwaj Raj (Indeed), Udit Jindal (Indeed)

Online job-application funnels are increasingly abused by automated campaigns that flood employers with non-genuine submissions, distorting metrics and eroding platform trust. We report on the first production-scale, defense-in-depth system that detects and mitigates such abuse in real time on Indeed.com, a major job marketplace processing tens of millions of applications each week. Our architecture couples lightweight client-side traps like selector obfuscation, distributed honeypots, browser-trust signals, and Google invisible reCAPTCHA with a multivariate Isolation-Forest anomaly model that operates entirely without labelled data. A novel precision-weighted F1 objective steers threshold selection to minimise user friction while preserving coverage. Deployed globally, the system blocks a significant number of fraudulent applications per day and achieves a 10.23% reduction in suspected abuse volume without degrading legitimate conversion. We detail the layered design, feature engineering, unsupervised modelling, and adaptive mitigation pipeline, and distill lessons for practitioners defending high-throughput, adversarial web services where labelled data are scarce.

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Context Relay for Long-Running Penetration-Testing Agents

Marius Vangeli (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden), Joel Brynielsson (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden and FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden), Mika Cohen (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden and FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden), Farzad Kamrani (FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden)

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Ipotane: Balancing the Good and Bad Cases of Asynchronous...

Xiaohai Dai (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Chaozheng Ding (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Hai Jin (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Julian Loss (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Ling Ren (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

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What Do They Fix? LLM-Aided Categorization of Security Patches...

Xingyu Li (UC Riverside), Juefei Pu (UC Riverside), Yifan Wu (UC Riverside), Xiaochen Zou (UC Riverside), Shitong Zhu (UC Riverside), Qiushi Wu (IBM), Zheng Zhang (UC Riverside), Joshua Hsu (UC Riverside), Yue Dong (UC Riverside), Zhiyun Qian (UC Riverside), Kangjie Lu (University of Minnesota), Trent Jaeger (UC Riverside), Michael De Lucia (U.S. Army Research Laboratory),…

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