Akshat Singh Jaswal (Stux Labs), Ashish Baghel (Stux Labs)

Modern web applications are increasingly produced through AI-assisted development and rapid no-code deployment pipelines, widening the gap between accelerating software velocity and the limited adaptability of existing security tooling. Pattern-driven scanners fail to reason about novel contexts, while emerging LLM-based penetration testers rely on unconstrained exploration, yielding high cost, unstable behavior, and poor reproducibility.

We introduce AWE, a memory-augmented multi-agent framework for autonomous web penetration testing that embeds structured, vulnerability-specific analysis pipelines within a lightweight LLM orchestration layer. Unlike general-purpose agents, AWE couples context aware payload mutations and generations with persistent memory and browser-backed verification to produce deterministic, exploitation-driven results.

Evaluated on the 104-challenge XBOW benchmark, AWE achieves substantial gains on injection-class vulnerabilities - 87% XSS success (+30.5% over MAPTA) and 66.7% blind SQL injection success (+33.3%) - while being much faster, cheaper, and more token-efficient than MAPTA, despite using a midtier model (Claude Sonnet 4) versus MAPTA’s GPT-5. MAPTA retains higher overall coverage due to broader exploratory capabilities, underscoring the complementary strengths of specialized and general-purpose architectures. Our results demonstrate that architecture matters as much as model reasoning capabilities: integrating LLMs into principled, vulnerability-aware pipelines yields substantial gains in accuracy, efficiency, and determinism for injection-class exploits. The source code for AWE is available at: https://github.com/stuxlabs/AWE

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Qizhi Cai (Zhejiang University), Lingzhi Wang (Northwestern University), Yao Zhu (Zhejiang University), Zhipeng Chen (Zhejiang University), Xiangmin Shen (Hofstra University), Zhenyuan Li (Zhejiang University)

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Fangzhou Dong (Arizona State University), Arvind S Raj (Arizona State University), Efrén López-Morales (New Mexico State University), Siyu Liu (Arizona State University), Yan Shoshitaishvili (Arizona State University), Tiffany Bao (Arizona State University), Adam Doupé (Arizona State University), Muslum Ozgur Ozmen (Arizona State University), Ruoyu Wang (Arizona State University)

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