Henry Chen (Palo Alto Networks), Victor Aranda (Palo Alto Networks), Samarth Keshari (Palo Alto Networks), Ryan Heartfield (Palo Alto Networks), Nicole Nichols (Palo Alto Networks)

Prompt-based attack techniques are one of the primary challenges in securely deploying and protecting LLM-based AI systems. LLM inputs are an unbounded, unstructured space. Consequently, effectively defending against these attacks requires proactive hardening strategies capable of continuously generating adaptive attack vectors to optimize LLM defense at runtime. We present HASTE (Hard-negative Attack Sample Training Engine): a systematic framework that iteratively engineers highly evasive prompts, within a modular optimization process, to continuously enhance detection efficacy for prompt-based attack techniques. The framework is agnostic to synthetic data generation methods, and can be generalized to evaluate prompt-injection detection efficacy, with and without fuzzing, for any hard-negative or hardpositive iteration strategy. Experimental evaluation of HASTE shows that hard negative mining successfully evades baseline detectors, reducing malicious prompt detection for baseline detectors by approximately 64%. However, when integrated with detection model re-training, it optimizes the efficacy of prompt detection models with significantly fewer iteration loops compared to relative baseline strategies.

The HASTE framework supports both proactive and reactive hardening of LLM defenses and guardrails. Proactively, developers can leverage HASTE to dynamically stress-test prompt injection detection systems; efficiently identifying weaknesses and strengthening defensive posture. Reactively, HASTE can mimic newly observed attack types and rapidly bridge detection coverage by teaching HASTE-optimized detection models to identify them.

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