Muhammad Muzammil (Stony Brook University), Zafir Ansari (Infoblox), Nick Nikiforakis (Stony Brook University), Darin Johnson (Infoblox)

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical component of the Internet, yet its foundational processes, such as domain registration and ownership changes, are generally opaque to end users. This lack of transparency enables adversaries to re-register expired domains and host malicious content that continues to receive traffic from users who trust and revisit the domain. In this paper, we introduce EchoLoc, a scalable system for detecting malicious re-registered domains across the entire TLD space that appear in live DNS resolution telemetry from Infoblox, a major DNS resolution and threat intelligence provider. We deploy EchoLoc for a one-month period, during which it analyzed 144.6M new domain registrations and identified 1.5M re-registrations, of which 66K were queried by customers. Using a machine learning-based website classification pipeline that combines structural features from web content with semantic signals derived from a large language model, we identify over 9K malicious re-registered domains. The classifier achieves 0.95 precision and recall for malicious domain detection, with an overall accuracy of 98.1%. Our analysis further shows that these domains exhibit user activity both prior to expiration and after re-registration.

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Analysing Privacy Risks in Children’s Educational Apps in Australia

Sicheng Jin (University of New South Wales), Rahat Masood (University of New South Wales), Jung-Sook Lee (University of New South Wales), Hye-Young (Helen) Paik (University of New South Wales)

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Chasing Shadows: Pitfalls in LLM Security Research

Jonathan Evertz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Niklas Risse (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Nicolai Neuer (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Andreas Müller (Ruhr University Bochum), Philipp Normann (TU Wien), Gaetano Sapia (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Srishti Gupta (Sapienza University of Rome), David Pape (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security),…

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Bleeding Pathways: Vanishing Discriminability in LLM Hidden States Fuels...

Yingjie Zhang (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences), Tong Liu (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences), Zhe Zhao (Ant Group), Guozhu Meng (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School…

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