Hannes Weissteiner (Graz University of Technology), Roland Czerny (Graz University of Technology), Simone Franza (Graz University of Technology), Stefan Gast (Graz University of Technology), Johanna Ullrich (University of Vienna), Daniel Gruss (Graz University of Technology)
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a core component of the Internet. Clients query DNS servers to translate domain names to IP addresses. Local DNS caches alleviate the time it takes to query a DNS server, thereby reducing delays to connection attempts. Prior work showed that DNS caches can be exploited via timing attacks to test whether a user has visited a specific website recently but lacked eviction capabilities, i.e., could not monitor when precisely a user accessed a website, others focused on DNS caches in routers. All prior attacks required some form of code execution (e.g., native code, Java, or JavaScript) on the victim’s system, which is also not always possible.
We introduce DMT, a novel Evict+Reload attack to continuously monitor a victim’s Internet accesses through the local, system-wide DNS cache. The foundation of DMT is reliable DNS cache eviction: We present 4 DNS cache eviction techniques to evict the local DNS cache in unprivileged and sandboxed native attacks, virtualized cross-VM attacks, as well as browser-based attacks, i.e., a website with JavaScript and a scriptless attack exploiting the serial loading of fonts integrated in websites. Our attack works both in default settings and when using DNS-over-TLS, DNSSEC, or non-default DNS forwarders for security. We observe eviction times of 77.267 ms on average across all contexts, using our fastest eviction primitive and reload and measurement times of 685.86 ms on average in the best case (cross-VM attack) for 100 domains and 14.710 s on average in the worst case (JavaScript-based attack). Hence, the blind spot of our attack for a granularity of five minutes is smaller than 0.26 % in the best case, and 4.92 % in the worst case, resulting in a reliable attack. In an end-to-end cross-VM attack, we can detect website visits from a list of 103 websites (in an open-world scenario) reliably with an F1 score of 92.48 % within less than one second. In our JavaScript-based attack, we achieve F1 scores of 82.86 % and 78.89 % for detecting accesses to 10 websites, with and without DNSSEC, respectively. We argue that DMT leaks information valuable for extortion and scam campaigns, or to serve exploits tailored to the victim’s EDR solution.