Claudio Migliorelli (IBM Research Europe - Zurich), Andrea Mambretti (IBM Research Europe - Zurich), Alessandro Sorniotti (IBM Research Europe - Zurich), Vittorio Zaccaria (Politecnico di Milano), Anil Kurmus (IBM Research Europe - Zurich)

Kernel memory allocators remain a critical attack surface, despite decades of research into memory corruption defenses. While recent mitigation strategies have diminished the effectiveness of conventional attack techniques, we show that robust cross-cache attacks are still feasible and pose a significant threat. In this paper, we introduce PCPLOST, a cross-cache memory massaging technique that bypasses mainline mitigations by carefully using side channels to infer the kernel allocator’s internal state. We demonstrate that vulnerabilities such as out-of-bounds (OOB) — and, via pivoting, use-after-free (UAF) and double-free (DF) — can be exploited reliably through a cross-cache attack, across all generic caches, even in the presence of noise. We validate the generality and robustness of our approach by exploiting 6 publicly disclosed CVEs by using PCPLOST, and discuss possible mitigations. The significant reliability (over 90% in most cases) of our approach in obtaining a cross-cache layout suggests that current mitigation strategies fail to offer comprehensive protection against such attacks within the Linux kernel.

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Di Zhai (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jiashuo Zhang (Peking University), Jianbo Gao (Beijing Jiaotong University), Tianhao Liu (Beijing Jiaotong University), Tao Zhang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jian Wang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jiqiang Liu (Beijing Jiaotong University)

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Rachel McAmis (MIT Lincoln Laboratory and University of Washington), Connor Willison (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Richard Skowyra (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Samuel Mergendahl (MIT Lincoln Laboratory)

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Qizhi Cai (Zhejiang University), Lingzhi Wang (Northwestern University), Yao Zhu (Zhejiang University), Zhipeng Chen (Zhejiang University), Xiangmin Shen (Hofstra University), Zhenyuan Li (Zhejiang University)

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