Marthin Toruan (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology), R.D.N. Shakya (University of Moratuwa), Samuel Tseitkin (ExeQuantum), Raymond K. Zhao (ExeQuantum), Nalin Arachchilage (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology)

Advances in quantum computing increasingly threaten the security and privacy of data protected by current cryptosystems, particularly those relying on public-key cryptography. In response, the international cybersecurity community has prioritized the implementation of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), a new cryptographic standard designed to resist quantum attacks while operating on classical computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has already standardized several PQC algorithms and plans to deprecate classical asymmetric schemes, such as RSA and ECDSA, by 2035. Despite this urgency, PQC adoption remains slow, often due to limited developer expertise. Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are intended to bridge this gap, yet prior research on classical security APIs demonstrates that poor usability of cryptographic APIs can lead developers to introduce vulnerabilities during implementation of the applications, a risk amplified by the novelty and complexity of PQC. To date, the usability of PQC APIs has not been systematically studied. This research presents an empirical evaluation of the usability of the PQC APIs, observing how developers interact with APIs and documentation during software development tasks. The study identifies cognitive factors that influence the developer’s performance when working with PQC primitives with minimal onboarding. The findings highlight opportunities across the PQC ecosystem to improve developer facing guidance, terminology alignment, and workflow examples to better support non-specialists.

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Guofu Liao (Shenzhen University), Taotao Wang (Shenzhen University), Shengli Zhang (Shenzhen University), Jiqun Zhang (Shenzhen University), Long Shi (Nanjing University of Science and Technology), Dacheng Tao (Nanyang Technological University)

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SNPeek: Side-Channel Analysis for Privacy Applications on Confidential VMs

Ruiyi Zhang (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security and Google), Albert Cheu (Google), Adria Gascon (Google), Daniel Moghimi (Google), Phillipp Schoppmann (Google), Michael Schwarz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Octavian Suciu (Google)

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ropbot: Reimaging Code Reuse Attack Synthesis

Kyle Zeng (Arizona State University), Moritz Schloegel (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Christopher Salls (UC Santa Barbara), Adam Doupé (Arizona State University), Ruoyu Wang (Arizona State University), Yan Shoshitaishvili (Arizona State University), Tiffany Bao (Arizona State University)

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