Ioanna Tzialla (New York University), Abhiram Kothapalli (Carnegie Mellon University), Bryan Parno (Carnegie Mellon University), Srinath Setty (Microsoft Research)

This paper introduces Verdict, a transparency dictionary, where an untrusted service maintains a label-value map that clients can query and update (foundational infrastructure for end-to-end encryption and other applications). To prevent unauthorized modifications to the dictionary, for example, by a malicious or a compromised service provider, Verdict produces publicly-verifiable cryptographic proofs that it correctly executes both reads and authorized updates. A key advance over prior work is that Verdict produces efficiently-verifiable proofs while incurring modest proving overheads. Verdict accomplishes this by composing indexed Merkle trees (a new SNARK-friendly data structure) with Phalanx (a new SNARK that supports amortized constant-sized proofs and leverages particular workload characteristics to speed up the prover). Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that Verdict scales to dictionaries with millions of labels while imposing modest overheads on the service and clients.

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COOPER: Testing the Binding Code of Scripting Languages with...

Peng Xu (TCA/SKLCS, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences), Yanhao Wang (QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute), Hong Hu (Pennsylvania State University), Purui Su (TCA/SKLCS, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

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PMTUD is not Panacea: Revisiting IP Fragmentation Attacks against...

Xuewei Feng (Tsinghua University), Qi Li (Tsinghua University), Kun Sun (George Mason University), Ke Xu (Tsinghua University), Baojun Liu (Tsinghua University), Xiaofeng Zheng (Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University; QiAnXin Technology Research Institute & Legendsec Information Technology (Beijing) Inc.), Qiushi Yang (QiAnXin Technology Research Institute & Legendsec Information Technology (Beijing) Inc.), Haixin Duan…

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hbACSS: How to Robustly Share Many Secrets

Thomas Yurek (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Licheng Luo (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Jaiden Fairoze (University of California, Berkeley), Aniket Kate (Purdue University), Andrew Miller (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

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