Nuno Sabino (Carnegie Mellon University, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, and Instituto de Telecomunicações), Darion Cassel (Carnegie Mellon University), Rui Abreu (Universidade do Porto, INESC-ID), Pedro Adão (Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, and Instituto de Telecomunicações), Lujo Bauer (Carnegie Mellon University), Limin Jia (Carnegie Mellon University)

DOM-based cross-site scripting (DOM-XSS) is a prevalent form of web vulnerability. Prior work on automated detection and confirmation of such vulnerabilities at scale has several limitations. First, prior work does not interact with the page and thus misses vulnerabilities in event handlers whose execution depends on user actions. Second, prior work does not find URL components, such as GET parameters and fragment values that, when instantiated with specific keys/values, execute more code paths. To address this, we introduce SWIPE, a DOM-XSS analysis infrastructure that uses fuzzing to generate user interactions to trigger event handlers and leverages dynamic symbolic execution (DSE) to automatically synthesize URL parameters and fragments. We run SWIPE on 44,480 URLs found in pages from the Tranco top 30,000 popular domains. Compared to prior work, SWIPE’s fuzzer finds 15% more vulnerabilities. Additionally, we find that a lack of parameters and fragments in URLs significantly hinders DOM-XSS detection, and show that SWIPE’s DSE engine can synthesize previously unseen URL parameters and fragments that trigger 20 new vulnerabilities.

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Formal Analysis of BLE Secure Connection Pairing and Revelation...

Min Shi (Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University), Yongkang Xiao (Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University), Jing Chen (Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing,…

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HoneySat: A Network-based Satellite Honeypot Framework

Efrén López-Morales (New Mexico State University), Ulysse Planta (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Gabriele Marra (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Carlos Gonzalez-Cortes (Universidad de Santiago de Chile and German Aerospace Center (DLR)), Jacob Hopkins (Texas A&M University - Corpus Christi), Majid Garoosi (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Elías Obreque (Universidad de Chile),…

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