Yusuke Kubo (NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS, Inc. / Waseda University), Fumihiro Kanei (NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS, Inc.), Mitsuaki Akiyama (NTT, Inc.), Takuro Wakai (Waseda University), Tatsuya Mori (Waseda University / NICT / RIKEN AIP)

GitHub Actions has become a dominant Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) platform, yet recent supply chain attacks like SolarWinds and tj-actions/changed-files highlight critical security vulnerabilities in such systems. While GitHub provides official security practices to mitigate these risks, the extent of their real-world implementation remains unknown. We present a mixed-methods study analyzing 338,812 public repositories and surveying over 100 developers to understand security practice implementation in GitHub Actions. Our findings reveal alarmingly low implementation rates across five key security practices, ranging from 0.6% to 52.9%. We identify three primary barriers: lack of awareness (up to 71.6% of non-adopters were unaware of practices), misconceptions about applicability, and concerns about operational costs. Repository characteristics such as organization ownership and recent development activity significantly correlate with better security practice implementation. Based on these empirical insights, we derive actionable recommendations that align intervention strategies with appropriate levels of automation, improve notification design to support awareness, strengthen platform- and IDE-level assistance, and clarify documentation on risks and applicability.

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Niklas Busch (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany), Philip Klostermeyer (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany), Jan H. Klemmer (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany), Yasemin Acar (Paderborn University, Germany), Sascha Fahl (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany)

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SNPeek: Side-Channel Analysis for Privacy Applications on Confidential VMs

Ruiyi Zhang (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Albert Cheu (Google), Adria Gascon (Google), Daniel Moghimi (Google), Phillipp Schoppmann (Google), Michael Schwarz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Octavian Suciu (Google)

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Practical Traceable Over-Threshold Multi-Party Private Set Intersection

Le Yang (School of Cyber Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China), Weijing You (Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Network Security and Cryptology, College of Computer and Cyber Security, Fujian Normal University), Huiyang He (School of Cyber Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China), Kailiang Ji (NIO Inc), Jingqiang…

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