Avinash Awasth (Malaviya National Institute of Technology Jaipur), Pritam Vediya (Malaviya National Institute of Technology Jaipur), Hemant Miranka (LNMIIT Jaipur), Ramesh Babu Battula (Malaviya National Institute of Technology Jaipur), Manoj Sigh Gaur (IIT Jammu)

The rapid augmentation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices that are resource-constrained in nature has significantly expanded the attack surface, exposed critical vulnerabilities in the network. As a result, traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), which rely on static, signature-based approaches, have become increasingly obsolete. Modern adversaries now employ sophisticated, automated, and often novel (zero-day) attacks that can easily bypass such conventional defenses. Moreover, the existing IDS models with machine learning often fail in real-world scenarios to handle challenges like concept drift and an inability to generalize to unseen threats. To address these gaps, we introduce PANDORA (Probabilistic Adversarial Network Defense Over Resource-constrained Architectures), a novel, end-to-end framework for detecting zero-day attacks on edge devices. PANDORA makes three key contributions: 1) It learns uncertainty-aware probabilistic embeddings to create robust representations of network traffic; 2) It introduces a novel Probabilistic Manifold Structuring and Distance (PMSD) Loss function that enables effective zero-shot generalization; and 3) It utilizes an efficient Mamba-Mixture of Experts (MoE) architecture for on-device deployment. To validate our approach, we also introduce the TTDFIOTIDS2025 dataset, a new, high-fidelity benchmark featuring complex, programmatically generated attacks. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate that PANDORA significantly outperforms state-of-the-art models, achieving an F1-score of 0.971 with just 10-shot adaptation on CICIDS2017. Critically, it achieves up to 99% accuracy in zero-shot detection under domain shift and, when deployed on a Raspberry Pi, maintains a low memory footprint of ˜24 MB and a throughput of up to 4.26 flows/sec, proving its practical viability for real-time edge security.

View More Papers

MVP-ORAM: a Wait-free Concurrent ORAM for Confidential BFT Storage

Robin Vassantlal (LASIGE, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal), Hasan Heydari (LASIGE, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal), Bernardo Ferreira (LASIGE, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal), Alysson Bessani (LASIGE, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal)

Read More

BunnyFinder: Finding Incentive Flaws for Ethereum Consensus

Rujia Li (Tsinghua University), Mingfei Zhang (Shandong University), Xueqian Lu (Independent Reseacher), Wenbo Xu (AntChain Platform Division, Ant Group), Ying Yan (Blockchain Platform Division, Ant Group), Sisi Duan (Tsinghua University)

Read More

PIRANHAS: PrIvacy-Preserving Remote Attestation in Non-Hierarchical Asynchronous Swarms

Jonas Hofmann (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Philipp-Florens Lehwalder (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Shahriar Ebrahimi (Alan Turing Institute), Parisa Hassanizadeh (IPPT PAN / University of Warwick), Sebastian Faust (Technische Universität Darmstadt)

Read More