Dongchao Zhou (Beijing University of Post and Telecommunication and QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute), Lingyun Ying (QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute), Huajun Chai (QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute), Dongbin Wang (Beijing University of Post and Telecommunication)

JavaScript's widespread adoption has made it an attractive target for malicious attackers who employ sophisticated obfuscation techniques to conceal harmful code. Current deobfuscation tools suffer from critical limitations that severely restrict their practical effectiveness. Existing tools struggle with diverse input formats, address only specific obfuscation types, and produce cryptic output that impedes human analysis.

To address these challenges, we present JSIMPLIFIER, a comprehensive deobfuscation tool using a multi-stage pipeline with preprocessing, abstract syntax tree-based static analysis, dynamic execution tracing, and Large Language Model (LLM)-enhanced identifier renaming. We also introduce multi-dimensional evaluation metrics that integrate control/data flow analysis, code simplification assessment, entropy measures and LLM-based readability assessments.

We construct and release the largest real-world obfuscated JavaScript dataset with 44,421 samples (23,212 wild malicious + 21,209 benign samples). Evaluation shows JSIMPLIFIER outperforms existing tools with 100% processing capability across 20 obfuscation techniques, 100% correctness on evaluation subsets, 88.2% code complexity reduction, and over 4-fold readability improvement validated by multiple LLMs. Our results advance benchmarks for JavaScript deobfuscation research and practical security applications.

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Meng Wang (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Philipp Görz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Joschua Schilling (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Keno Hassler (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Liwei Guo (University of Electronic Science and Technology), Thorsten Holz (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Ali Abbasi (CISPA Helmholtz Center for…

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Select-Then-Compute: Encrypted Label Selection and Analytics over Distributed Datasets...

Nirajan Koirala (University of Notre Dame), Seunghun Paik (Hanyang University), Sam Martin (University of Notre Dame), Helena Berens (University of Notre Dame), Tasha Januszewicz (University of Notre Dame), Jonathan Takeshita (Old Dominion University), Jae Hong Seo (Hanyang University), Taeho Jung (University of Notre Dame)

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Zheng Liu (University of Virginia), Chen Gong (University of Virginia), Terry Yue Zhuo (Monash University and CSIRO's Data61), Kecen Li (University of Virginia), Weichen Yu (Carnegie Mellon University), Matt Fredrikson (Carnegie Mellon University), Tianhao Wang (University of Virginia)

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