Sofia Celi (Brave Software), Alex Davidson (NOVA LINCS & Universidade NOVA de Lisboa), Hamed Haddadi (Imperial College London & Brave Software), Gonçalo Pestana (Hashmatter), Joe Rowell (Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London)

We design DiStefano: an efficient, maliciously-secure framework for generating private commitments over TLS-encrypted web traffic, for verification by a designated third-party. DiStefano provides many improvements over previous TLS commitment systems, including: a modular protocol specific to TLS 1.3, support for arbitrary verifiable claims over encrypted data, client browsing history privacy amongst pre-approved TLS servers, and various optimisations to ensure fast online performance of the TLS 1.3 session. We build a permissive open-source implementation of DiStefano integrated into the BoringSSL cryptographic library (used by Chromium-based Internet browsers). We show that DiStefano is practical in both LAN and WAN settings for committing to facts in arbitrary TLS traffic, requiring < 1 s and ≤ 80 KiB to execute the complete online phase of the protocol.

View More Papers

User Comprehension and Comfort with Eye-Tracking and Hand-Tracking Permissions...

Kaiming Cheng (University of Washington), Mattea Sim (Indiana University), Tadayoshi Kohno (University of Washington), Franziska Roesner (University of Washington)

Read More

Reinforcement Unlearning

Dayong Ye (University of Technology Sydney), Tianqing Zhu (City University of Macau), Congcong Zhu (City University of Macau), Derui Wang (CSIRO’s Data61), Kun Gao (University of Technology Sydney), Zewei Shi (CSIRO’s Data61), Sheng Shen (Torrens University Australia), Wanlei Zhou (City University of Macau), Minhui Xue (CSIRO's Data61)

Read More

Can Public IP Blocklists Explain Internet Radiation?

Simone Cossaro (University of Trieste), Damiano Ravalico (University of Trieste), Rodolfo Vieira Valentim (University of Turin), Martino Trevisan (University of Trieste), Idilio Drago (University of Turin)

Read More