Georgios Syros (Northeastern University), Anshuman Suri (Northeastern University), Jacob Ginesin (Northeastern University), Cristina Nita-Rotaru (Northeastern University), Alina Oprea (Northeastern University)

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly interact, collaborate, and delegate tasks to one another autonomously with minimal human interaction. Industry guidelines for agentic system governance emphasize the need for users to maintain comprehensive control over their agents, mitigating potential damage from malicious agents. Several proposed agentic system designs address agent identity, authorization, and delegation, but remain purely theoretical, without concrete implementation and evaluation. Most importantly, they do not provide user-controlled agent management.

To address this gap, we propose SAGA, a scalable Security Architecture for Governing Agentic systems, that offers user oversight over their agents’ lifecycle. In our design, users register their agents with a central entity, the Provider, that maintains agents contact information, user-defined access control policies, and helps agents enforce these policies on inter-agent communication. We introduce a cryptographic mechanism for deriving access control tokens, that offers fine-grained control over an agent’s interaction with other agents, providing formal security guarantees. We evaluate SAGA on several agentic tasks, using agents in different geolocations, and multiple on-device and cloud LLMs, demonstrating minimal performance overhead with no impact on underlying task utility in a wide range of conditions. Our architecture enables secure and trustworthy deployment of autonomous agents, accelerating the responsible adoption of this technology in sensitive environments.

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Context Relay for Long-Running Penetration-Testing Agents

Marius Vangeli (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden), Joel Brynielsson (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden and FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden), Mika Cohen (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden and FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden), Farzad Kamrani (FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden)

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Mirage: Private, Mobility-based Routing for Censorship Evasion

Zachary Ratliff (Harvard University), Ruoxing (David) Yang (Georgetown University), Avery Bai (Georgetown University), Harel Berger (Ariel University), Micah Sherr (Georgetown University), James Mickens (Harvard University)

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Cascading and Proxy Membership Inference Attacks

Yuntao Du (Purdue University), Jiacheng Li (Purdue University), Yuetian Chen (Purdue University), Kaiyuan Zhang (Purdue University), Zhizhen Yuan (Purdue University), Hanshen Xiao (Purdue University and NVIDIA Research), Bruno Ribeiro (Purdue University), Ninghui Li (Purdue University)

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